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Abstract One-sided assignment problems combine important features of two well-
known matching models. First, as in roommate problems, any two agents can be
matched and second, as in two-sided assignment problems, the division of payoffs
to agents is flexible as part of the solution. We take a similar approach to one-sided
assignment problems as Sasaki (Int J Game Theory 24:373–397, 1995) for two-sided
assignment problems, and we analyze various desirable properties of solutions includ-
ing consistency and weak pairwise-monotonicity. We show that for the class of solv-
able one-sided assignment problems (i.e., the subset of one-sided assignment problems
with a non-empty core), if a subsolution of the core satisfies [Pareto indifference and
consistency] or [invariance with respect to unmatching dummy pairs, continuity, and
consistency], then it coincides with the core (Theorems 1 and 2 ). However, we also
prove that on the class of all one-sided assignment problems (solvable or not), no
solution satisfies consistency and coincides with the core whenever the core is non-
empty (Theorem 4). Finally, we comment on the difficulty in obtaining further positive
results for the class of solvable one-sided assignment problems in line with Sasaki’s
(1995) characterizations of the core for two-sided assignment problems.
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1 Introduction
Most racket sports (tennis, squash, badminton, etc.) have established top level doubles
competitions. At the start of each tournament, there is a pre-defined time frame in
which players have to organize themselves into pairs. The players are professionals
who can make good estimates with respect to the potential gains of each possible pair.
Once pairs are formed, partners cannot be changed during a tournament. If a player
fails to form a pair he cannot participate in the doubles tournament. The players, with
very few exceptions, are driven not only by their passion for the sport but also by
pecuniary interests. The latter play an important role as the prizes at stake in the tour-
naments represent the players’ most significant source of revenue. This situation leads
to a problem, where (rational) players have to simultaneously decide upon how to form
pairs and how to distribute payoffs. Since reshuffling of the pairs between tournaments
is minor, we assume that there are many instances where the problem faced by the
players has a stable solution. But what properties would this solution satisfy? What
would happen to the solution if some pairs dropped out of the competition with their
gains? From one tournament to another changes in the player hierarchy are relatively
small. Consequently, players’ estimations with respect to the potential gains of each
pair are likely to be adjusted by small amounts only. Does the adjustment affect the
solution? Could we have distinct solutions that for each player keep the payoff invari-
ant, but recommend different pairs to form? We call the situation described in this
example a one-sided (assignment) problem, and we call the properties of the solutions
hinted at in the questions above consistency, continuity, and Pareto indifference.
More generally, one-sided problems capture situations where any two agents may
negotiate whether or not to enter a partnership and how to allocate resulting payoffs.
Hence, a one-sided problem can be viewed as a very simple model of simultaneous
network formation and allocation of value. Alternatively, a one-sided problem can be
modeled in form of a cooperative game with transferable utility (see Remark 1). Fur-
thermore, one-sided problems have many similarities with two well-known matching
problems: roommate problems (Gale and Shapley 1962) and assignment problems
(Shapley and Shubik 1972). In roommate problems, agents have preferences over
other agents and being alone (or consuming an outside option), and agents can either
be matched in pairs or remain single. A one-sided problem coincides with a roommate
problem if any single agent consumes his own value and any pair of agents consumes
their joint value according to a predetermined division. In other words, a one-sided
problem models a roommate problem where the assumption that payoffs to agents are
fixed ex-ante is relaxed. In two-sided (assignment) problems, the set of agents is parti-
tioned into two sets and only agents from different sets can form pairs. Then, based on
how agents are matched in such a two-sided market, the division of payoffs to agents
is flexible and part of the solution. Here, we generalize both models by allowing for
one-sided matching as in roommate problems and for flexible division of payoffs as
in two-sided problems.
Eriksson and Karlander (2001), Sotomayor (2005), and Talman and Yang (2008)
modeled and analyzed one-sided problems, although the terminology for “one-sided
problems” differs in these papers. Eriksson and Karlander (2001) refer to roommate
games with transferable utility, Sotomayor (2005) analyzes one-sided assignment
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games, and Talman and Yang (2008) study partner formation problems. We use
the “one-sided” terminology to emphasize the relation of our results with those of
Sasaki (1995) for two-sided assignment problems. A one-sided problem consists of
a set of agents and a value function that specifies the value each pair of agents cre-
ates if matched (single agents do not create any value). A feasible outcome for a
one-sided problem is a matching that partitions the set of agents in pairs and sin-
gletons and a payoff vector that divides the total value of the matching between the
agents. A solution assigns to any one-sided problem a non-empty subset of feasi-
ble outcomes. As in many other economies, a concept of special interest is the core.
Eriksson and Karlander (2001) use graph theory techniques and give a characteriza-
tion of the core by a forbidden minors criterion. Sotomayor (2005) uses combinatorial
arguments to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for the non-emptiness of
the core. Talman and Yang (2008) use linear programming to provide necessary and
sufficient conditions under which the core exists. Since there exist one-sided problems
without core outcomes, strictly speaking the core is not a solution.
We call a one-sided problem with a non-empty core solvable. First, we show that
a solvable one-sided problem is not essentially equal to a two-sided problem (Exam-
ple 2), i.e., a solvable one-sided problem cannot always be mapped onto a core-
isomorphic two-sided problem. Then, we aim to extend insights from the normative
analysis of two-sided problems to solvable one-sided problems.
For two-sided problems, several characterizations of the core use consistency as
a central property. Consistency is an invariance requirement of the solutions if some
couples and singles leave with their payoffs. In order to understand this property, sup-
pose that after agents are matched and payoffs are divided according to the solution,
some agents leave with their assignment, and for the remaining agents, we apply the
same solution. A solution would be considered to be “inconsistent” if it solves the
problem for the remaining agents differently than before. For a comprehensive survey
on consistency, see Thomson (2009).
In his first characterization, Sasaki (1995, Theorem 2) considers consistency in
conjunction with individual rationality, couple rationality, Pareto optimality, conti-
nuity, and weak pairwise-monotonicity. In his second characterization, Sasaki (1995,
Theorem 4) replaces continuity by Pareto indifference. He proves both characteriza-
tions by showing that (Step 1) the core satisfies all properties used in both charac-
terizations, (Step 2) a solution that satisfies all properties as stated in each of the
characterizations is a subsolution of the core, and (Step 3) a solution that is a subso-
lution of the core and satisfies all properties as stated in each of the characterizations
coincides with the core. For a two-sided problem closely related to the one investigated
by Sasaki (1995), Toda (2005) also obtains two characterizations of the core (Toda
2005, Theorems 3.1 and 3.2) and he discusses how his results relate to Sasaki’s results
(Toda 2005, page 249).
We adopt the properties considered by Sasaki (1995) to see how far his results for
two-sided problems can be extended to one-sided problems. Since Sasaki (1995) char-
acterized the core, we start by restricting attention to the class of solvable one-sided
problems. First, and corresponding to Step 1 of Sasaki’s analysis, we prove that on the
class of solvable one-sided problems, the core satisfies all of the properties considered
by Sasaki (1995) (Proposition 1). Second, and corresponding to Step 3 of Sasaki’s
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analysis, we show that for the class of solvable one-sided problems, if a subsolution of
the core satisfies (i) Pareto indifference and consistency or (ii) invariance with respect
to unmatching dummy pairs, continuity, and consistency, then it coincides with the
core (Theorems 1 and 2). Note that invariance with respect to unmatching dummy
pairs is a property that we introduce, and that without it neither our Theorem 2 nor
Sasaki’s corresponding Theorem 1 would be correct (see Example 5). Adapting Sasa-
ki’s Step 2 directly to solvable one-sided problems turns out to be impossible because
certain steps in the proof would transform a solvable one-sided problem into one with
an empty core. We discuss this issue with Step 2 for solvable one-sided problems in
Subsect. 4.2. It is currently an open question if Sasaki’s (1995, Theorems 2 and 4)
characterizations of the core can be extended to the class of solvable one-sided prob-
lems. Finally, we prove that on the class of all one-sided problems (solvable or not),
no solution satisfies consistency and coincides with the core whenever the core is
non-empty (Theorem 4).
2 Model and definitions
Let N be the set of potential agents and N be the set of all non-empty finite subsets
of N, i.e., N = {N ⊆ N | ∞ > |N | > 0}. For each N ∈ N , we denote the set of
distinct pairs that agents in N can form (including the degenerate case where agent
i ∈ N forms the “pair” (i, i)) by P(N ) = {(i, j) ∈ N × N | i ≤ j}. For each N ∈ N ,
a function π : P(N ) → R+ such that for each i ∈ N , π(i, i) = 0, is a characteristic
function for N . For each pair (i, j) ∈ P(N ), π(i, j) ≥ 0 is the monetary benefit, or
value, that i and j can jointly obtain. We call π(i, i) the reservation value of agent i
and normalize it to be 0. Let (N ) be the set of all characteristic functions on P(N ).
A one-sided (assignment) problem γ is a pair (N , π) ∈ N × (N ). A two-sided
(assignment) problem is a one-sided problem where the set of agents N can be par-
titioned in two subsets M and W , i.e., N = M ∪ W and M ∩ W = ∅, and all
pairs of agents from the same subset or side fail to generate strictly positive values,
i.e., for each (i, j) ∈ M × M and (i, j) ∈ W × W, π(i, j) = 0. We denote the
set of all one-sided problems for N ∈ N by N , and the set of all one-sided prob-
lems by  = ⋃N∈N N . From now on, we refer to one-sided problems simply as
problems, except when referring to one-sided problems in comparison to two-sided
problems.
Let N ∈ N . A matching μ for N (or γ ∈ N ) is a function μ : N → N of
order two, i.e., for each i ∈ N , μ(μ(i)) = i . Two agents i, j ∈ N are matched
if μ(i) = j (or equivalently μ( j) = i); for convenience, we also use the notation
(i, j) ∈ μ. If i = j , then we say that agents i and j form a couple. If i = j , we say
that agent i remains single. Thus, at any matching μ, the set of agents is partitioned
into a set of couples C(μ) = {(i, j) ∈ P(N ) | μ(i) = j, i = j} and a set of sin-
gles S(μ) = {i ∈ N | μ(i) = i}, with |N | = 2|C(μ)| + |S(μ)|. For simplicity, we
also denote a matching by a vector, e.g., for N = {1, 2, 3} and matching μ such that
C(μ) = {(1, 2)} and S(μ) = {3}, we write μ = (2, 1, 3). Let M(N ) denote the set
of matchings for N (or γ ).
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In the following, we assume that γ ∈ N .
A matching μ ∈ M(N ) is optimal for γ if for each μ′ ∈ M(N ),∑(i, j)∈μ π(i, j) ≥∑
(i, j)∈μ′ π(i, j). Let OM(γ ) denote the set of these matchings. Note that
OM(γ ) = ∅.
A feasible outcome for γ is a pair (μ, u) ∈ M(N ) × R|N | where μ is a matching
and u is a payoff vector such that ∑i∈N ui =
∑
(i, j)∈μ π(i, j) =
∑
(i, j)∈C(μ) π(i, j).
Let F(γ ) denote the set of feasible outcomes for γ .
A feasible outcome (μ, u) is Pareto optimal for γ if for each μ′ ∈ M(N ),∑i∈N ui= ∑(i, j)∈μ π(i, j) ≥
∑
(i, j)∈μ′ π(i, j). Let PO(γ ) denote the set of these outcomes.
Note that if μ is optimal for γ , then any feasible outcome (μ, u) is Pareto optimal for γ .
The next property is a voluntary participation condition based on the idea that an
agent can always enforce his reservation value by staying single.
A feasible outcome (μ, u) is individually rational for γ if for each i ∈ N , ui ≥ 0.
Let IR(γ ) denote the set of these outcomes.
Next, we require that if two agents form a couple, they receive a total payoff that
is greater than or equal to their value.
A feasible outcome (μ, u) is couple rational for γ if for each (i, j) ∈ C(μ), ui +
u j ≥ π(i, j). Let CR(γ ) denote the set of these outcomes.1 Non-negativity of values
and feasibility imply that if a feasible outcome (μ, u) is couple rational, then for each
(i, j) ∈ C(μ), ui + u j = π(i, j) and for each i ∈ S(μ), ui = π(i, i).
If, at a feasible outcome (μ, u), there are two agents (i, j) ∈ P(N ) such that i = j
and ui + u j < π(i, j), then i and j have an incentive to form a couple in order to
obtain a higher payoff. In this case, {i, j} is a blocking pair for the outcome (μ, u).
A feasible outcome (μ, u) is stable for γ if it is individually rational for γ and
no blocking pairs exist, i.e., (μ, u) ∈ IR(γ ) and for each (i, j) ∈ P(N ) such that
i = j, ui + u j ≥ π(i, j). Let S(γ ) denote the set of these outcomes.
It is well-known that if an agent is single at a stable outcome, then at each stable out-
come, he receives his reservation value (e.g., Roth and Sotomayor 1990, Lemma 8.5).
A problem γ ∈ N is solvable if S(γ ) = ∅. The following example shows that the
set of stable outcomes may be empty.
Example 1 (A problem that is not solvable) Let N = {1, 2, 3}, π be defined by
π(1, 2) = π(2, 3) = π(1, 3) = 1, and γ = (N , π). Then, for each (μ, u) ∈
F(γ ), u1 + u2 + u3 ≤ 1 and there exist two agents i and j, i = j , such that
ui + u j < π(i, j) = 1. Thus, S(γ ) = ∅. 
Remark 1 (The set of stable outcomes equals the core) The set of stable outcomes
coincides with the core (Sotomayor 2005, Proposition 1). Alternatively, we could
model a problem γ ∈ N as the cooperative game with transferable utility (TU)
whose characteristic function υ assigns to each coalition S, the number υ(S) ≡
maxμ∈M(S){
∑
(i, j)∈μ π(i, j)} with υ(∅) = 0. The core of γ ∈ N is the set C(γ ) =
{(μ, u) ∈ F(γ ) | for all S ⊆ N ,∑i∈S ui ≥ υ(S)}. Thus, for any problem γ ∈ N ,
a feasible outcome is in the core if no coalition of agents S ⊆ N can improve their
payoffs by rematching among themselves. 
1 Our definition of couple rationality is identical to the one in Sasaki (1995) and it implies (pairwise)
feasibility in Toda (2005) and Sotomayor (2005).
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From now on, we simply refer to the set of stable outcomes as the core.
Eriksson and Karlander (2001) find many similarities between solvable one-sided
problems and two-sided problems. The impression one might get is that in the core
of solvable one-sided problems, there always exists a “two-sided” partition of the
agents. Then, it is possible that for each solvable one-sided problem, there exists
a core-isomorphic two-sided problem, i.e., by choosing the appropriate partition of
agents (setting the values of now incompatible pairs equal to zero) one can convert
the one-sided problem into a two-sided problem without changing the set of core
outcomes. The following example shows that this cannot always be done.
Example 2 (Two-sided and solvable one-sided problems are not core-isomorphic) Let
N = {1, 2, 3}, π be defined by π(1, 2) = 2, π(2, 3) = π(1, 3) = 1, and γ = (N , π).
Then, γ is solvable because S(γ ) = {(μ, u) | μ = (2, 1, 3) and u = (1, 1, 0)}. The
unique stable matching μ induces a natural partition of the set of agents N = M ∪ W
where agents 1 and 2 have different genders. Assume that this solvable one-sided
problem can be mapped onto a core-isomorphic two-sided problem and, without loss
of generality, M = {1, 3} and W = {2}. Then, formally, we can associate with γ a
two-sided problem γ ′ ≡ (M∪W, π ′), where we define π ′ as the restriction of π to fea-
sible (man–woman) pairs, i.e., π ′(1, 2) = 2, π ′(2, 3) = 1, and π ′(1, 3) = 0 (agents 1
and 3 are both male and now do not create any positive value). The problem γ ′ is still
solvable since S(γ ′) = {(μ, u′) | μ = (2, 1, 3) and u′ = (α, 2−α, 0) for α ∈ [0, 1]}.
Observe that u′1 ≤ u1, u′2 ≥ u2, and u′3 = u3, and that the same matching μ is part of
both S(γ ) and S(γ ′). Thus, S(γ )  S(γ ′) and consequently γ ′ is not core-isomorphic
to γ . 
A solution specifies how to form couples and how to distribute payoffs among the
agents. Formally, a solution ϕ associates with each γ ∈  a non-empty subset of
feasible outcomes, i.e., for each γ ∈ , ϕ(γ ) ⊆ F(γ ) and ϕ(γ ) = ∅. A solution ϕ′ is
a subsolution of solution ϕ if for each γ ∈ , ϕ′(γ ) ⊆ ϕ(γ ).
3 Properties of solutions
In this section, we introduce desirable properties of solutions.
Individual rationality: for each γ ∈ , ϕ(γ ) ⊆ IR(γ ).
Couple rationality: for each γ ∈ , ϕ(γ ) ⊆ CR(γ ).
Pareto optimality: for each γ ∈ , ϕ(γ ) ⊆ PO(γ ).
The next property requires that if an outcome is chosen by the solution, then all fea-
sible outcomes with the same payoff vector have to be part of the solution.
Pareto indifference: for each γ ∈  and each (μ, u) ∈ ϕ(γ ), if (μ′, u) ∈ F(γ ), then
(μ′, u) ∈ ϕ(γ ).
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Note that we use the term Pareto indifference with some abuse of terminology since
agents’ preferences are only indirectly determined by payoffs (each agent’s preference
relation is strictly monotonic in his payoff).
For the next property, we introduce the notion of a dummy pair for a matching:
two agents who are a couple at a given matching but do not create any strictly positive
value. Let γ ∈ N . For μ ∈ M(N ), i and j are a dummy pair at μ if (i, j) ∈ C(μ)
and π(i, j) = 0. Let D A(γ, μ) denote the set of agents that form dummy pairs at μ.
We call D A(γ, μ) the set of dummy agents at μ.
The following property requires that if an outcome for which the matching con-
tains dummy pairs is chosen by the solution, then all feasible outcomes obtained by
“unmatching” some of the dummy agents have to be part of the solution.
Invariance with respect to unmatching dummy pairs: for each γ ∈ , each (μ, u) ∈
ϕ(γ ), and all (μ′, u) ∈ F(γ ) such that C(μ′) ⊆ C(μ) and S(μ′) \ S(μ) ⊆
D A(γ, μ), (μ′, u) ∈ ϕ(γ ).2
Note that invariance with respect to unmatching dummy pairs has no bite if
D A(γ, μ) = ∅. Furthermore, Pareto indifference implies invariance with respect
to unmatching dummy pairs.
The following is a standard technical requirement. Loosely speaking, it requires
that small changes in the value function do not cause large changes in the payoffs and
no sudden changes in supporting matchings.
Let N ∈ N . Let {πk}k∈N be a sequence of characteristic functions for N . Then,
we write πk −−−→
k→∞ π if for each (i, j) ∈ P(N ), π
k(i, j) −−−→
k→∞ π(i, j). Let {u
k}k∈N
be a sequence of payoff vectors for N . Then, we write uk −−−→
k→∞ u if for each
i ∈ N , uki −−−→k→∞ ui .
Continuity: for each N ∈ N , each μ ∈ M(N ), each sequence {πk}k∈N, and each
sequence {uk}k∈N such that for each k ∈ N, πk ∈ (N ) and (μ, uk) ∈ ϕ(N , πk), if
(N , πk) −−−→
k→∞ (N , π) and u
k −−−→
k→∞ u, then (μ, u) ∈ ϕ(N , π).
Thus, a solution satisfies continuity if it is a closed correspondence. Our definition
of continuity is one of the possible generalizations of continuity from functions to
correspondences and in line with upper-hemicontinuity.3
In order to define the next property, we first introduce the notion of a subproblem.
Let γ = (N , π), N ′ ⊆ N , and P(N ′) = {(i, j) ∈ N ′ × N ′ | i ≤ j}. We denote by
π|N ′ the restriction of value function π to P(N ′), i.e., π|N ′ : P(N ′) → R+ is such
that for each (i, j) ∈ P(N ′), π|N ′(i, j) = π(i, j). Then, γ|N ′ = (N ′, π|N ′) ∈ N ′ is
a subproblem of γ .
2 Note that C(μ′) ⊆ C(μ) implies S(μ′) ⊇ S(μ).
3 Under some mild requirements (e.g., compactness), our “closed-correspondence continuity” is equivalent
to upper-hemicontinuity. Continuity of correspondences is usually defined by requiring upper- and lower-
hemicontinuity. Hence, strictly speaking, we (as well as Sasaki 1995) use the term continuity to shorten the
name of our continuity property with some abuse of terminology.
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For any matching μ ∈ M(N ), we denote by μ(N ′) the set of agents who are
matched to agents in N ′, i.e., μ(N ′) = {i ∈ N | μ−1(i) ∈ N ′}. Furthermore, for each
u ∈ R|N |, let u|N ′ denote the restriction of payoff vector u to N ′, i.e., u|N ′ ≡ u′ ∈ R|N ′|
such that for each i ∈ N ′, u′i = ui .
Next is an invariance requirement of the solutions if some couples and singles leave
with their payoffs.
Consistency: for each N ∈ N , each γ ∈ N , each (μ, u) ∈ ϕ(γ ), and each N ′ ⊆ N
such that μ(N ′) = N ′, (μ|N ′ , u|N ′) ∈ ϕ(γ|N ′).
For a comprehensive survey on consistency, see Thomson (2009).
Finally, we introduce a monotonicity property that requires that if the value of a
couple increases, then the total payoff of the couple should not decrease.
Weak pairwise-monotonicity: for each N ∈ N , each π ∈ (N ), each (i, j) ∈
P(N ), i = j , and each π∗ ∈ (N ) such that
π∗(i, j) ≥ π(i, j) and (1)
π∗(i ′, j ′) = π(i ′, j ′), otherwise, (2)
if (μ, u) ∈ ϕ(N , π), then there exists (μ∗, u∗) ∈ ϕ(N , π∗) such that u∗i + u∗j ≥
ui + u j .
4 Results
4.1 Positive results on the class of solvable problems
Our first positive result is that the core of solvable problems satisfies all of the above
properties, which extends a similar result by Sasaki (1995, Propositions 3 and 4) for
two-sided problems to solvable one-sided problems.4
Proposition 1 On the class of solvable problems, the core satisfies individual rational-
ity, couple rationality, Pareto optimality, Pareto indifference, invariance with respect to
unmatching dummy pairs, continuity, consistency, and weak pairwise-monotonicity.
Proof
Individual rationality, couple rationality, and Pareto optimality: for each solvable
γ ∈ , if (μ, u) ∈ S(γ ), then it is immediate that (μ, u) ∈ PO(γ )∩IR(γ )∩CR(γ ).
Pareto indifference and invariance with respect to unmatching dummy pairs: for each
solvable γ ∈ , assume (μ, u) ∈ S(γ ). Let (μ′, u) ∈ F(γ ). Then, since any blocking
pair for (μ′, u) would also be a blocking pair for (μ, u), (μ′, u) ∈ S(γ ). Furthermore,
Pareto indifference implies invariance with respect to unmatching dummy pairs.
Continuity: let N ∈ N , μ ∈ M(N ), {πk}k∈N, and {uk}k∈N such that for all k ∈
N, πk ∈ (N ) and (μ, uk) ∈ S(N , πk). Assume that (N , πk) −−−→
k→∞ (N , π) and
4 The core of solvable problems also satisfies another consistency property called converse consistency.
However, since we do not use converse consistency in the sequel, we do not include this result here.
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uk −−−→
k→∞ u. Since the correspondence of feasible outcomes is continuous, (μ, u) is
feasible. By stability, for each i ∈ N , uki ≥ 0 and for each (i, j) ∈ P(N ), uki + ukj ≥
πk(i, j). Letting k → ∞, for each i ∈ N , ui ≥ 0 and for each (i, j) ∈ P(N ), ui +
u j ≥ π(i, j). Hence, (μ, u) ∈ S(N , π).
Consistency: for each solvable γ ∈ , if (μ, u) ∈ S(γ ), then there is no blocking pair
for (μ, u). Hence, no blocking pair exists in any of the (smaller) reduced problems,
and all reduced problems are solvable.
Weak pairwise-monotonicity: let N , (i, j) ∈ P(N ), and π, π∗ ∈ (N ) be as in the
definition of weak pairwise-monotonicity. We show that (μ, u) ∈ S(N , π) implies
that there exists (μ∗, u∗) ∈ S(N , π∗) such that u∗i + u∗j ≥ ui + u j .
Let (μ, u) ∈ S(N , π).
Case 1 μ(i) = j .
Let μ∗ = μ and define u∗ as follows: u∗i = ui + [π∗(i, j) − π(i, j)]/2, u∗j =
u j + [π∗(i, j) − π(i, j)]/2 and for each i ′ ∈ N \ {i, j}, u∗i ′ = ui ′ . By (1), π∗(i, j) ≥
π(i, j) and consequently u∗i , u∗j ≥ 0. Thus, (μ∗, u∗) ∈ IR(N , π∗). Since (i, j) ∈
C(μ∗), u∗i + u∗j = π∗(i, j). By definition of u∗, for each (i ′, j ′) = (i, j), u∗i ′ + u∗j ′ =
ui ′ + u j ′ . Since (μ, u) ∈ S(N , π), ui ′ + u j ′ ≥ π(i ′, j ′) and by (2), π(i ′, j ′) =
π∗(i ′, j ′). Thus, for each (i ′, j ′) ∈ P(N ) such that i ′ = j ′ we have u∗i ′ + u∗j ′ ≥
π∗(i ′, j ′), i.e., (μ∗, u∗) ∈ S(N , π∗). Note that u∗i +u∗j = ui +u j +[π∗(i, j)−π(i, j)]
which by (1), yields u∗i + u∗j ≥ ui + u j .
Case 2 μ(i) = j .
Let (μ∗, u∗) ∈ S(N , π∗). Then, μ∗ ∈ OM(N , π∗) and consequently,∑
(i ′, j ′)∈μ∗ π∗(i ′, j ′) ≥
∑
(i ′, j ′)∈μ π∗(i ′, j ′). By (2) and since (i, j) /∈ C(μ),∑
(i ′, j ′)∈μ π∗(i ′, j ′) =
∑
(i ′, j ′)∈μ π(i ′, j ′). Thus,
∑
(i ′, j ′)∈μ∗ π∗(i ′, j ′) ≥
∑
(i ′, j ′)∈μ π(i ′, j ′). (3)
Case 2.1 μ∗(i) = j .
By (3) and feasibility, ∑i ′∈N u∗i ′ =
∑
(i ′, j ′)∈μ∗ π∗(i ′, j ′) ≥
∑
(i ′, j ′)∈μ π(i ′, j ′) =∑
i ′∈N ui ′ . Suppose u∗i + u∗j < ui + u j . Then,∑
i ′∈N\{i, j} u∗i ′ =
∑
(i ′, j ′)∈μ∗\{(i, j)} π∗(i ′, j ′) >
∑
i ′∈N\{i, j} ui ′ . Thus, there exists
(i ′′, j ′′) = (i, j) such that (i ′′, j ′′) ∈ C(μ∗) and π∗(i ′′, j ′′) > ui ′′ +u j ′′ . However, by
(2), π∗(i ′′, j ′′) = π(i ′′, j ′′). Hence, π(i ′′, j ′′) > ui ′′ + u j ′′ , which is a contradiction
to (μ, u) ∈ S(N , π). Therefore, u∗i + u∗j ≥ ui + u j .
Case 2.2 μ∗(i) = j .
Further, assume μ /∈ OM(N , π∗). Then, (3) is strict and by (2), ∑(i ′, j ′)∈μ∗ π∗(i ′, j ′)
= ∑(i ′, j ′)∈μ∗ π(i ′, j ′). Consequently,
∑
(i, j)∈μ∗ π(i, j) >
∑
(i, j)∈μ π(i, j), which is
a contradiction to μ ∈ OM(N , π). Alternatively, now assume μ ∈ OM(N , π∗).
Then, we could have chosen u∗ = u, which gives u∗i + u∗j = ui + u j . unionsq
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Remark 2 (The class of solvable one-sided problems is closed) An immediate con-
sequence of the continuity of the core (Proposition 1) is that the class of solvable
problems is topologically closed, i.e., if for all k ∈ N, (N , πk) ∈ N is solvable,
(N , πk) −−−→
k→∞ (N , π) ∈ 
N and uk −−−→
k→∞ u, then (N , π) is also solvable. 
The next theorem is a counterpart of Sasaki (1995, Theorem 3) for solvable
problems.
Theorem 1 On the class of solvable problems, if ϕ is a subsolution of the core satis-
fying consistency and Pareto indifference, then ϕ coincides with the core.
Proof Let γ ∈ N be a solvable problem. Then, ϕ(γ ) ⊆ S(γ ). We prove that
ϕ(γ ) ⊇ S(γ ), i.e., we show that (μ, u) ∈ S(γ ) implies (μ, u) ∈ ϕ(γ ).
Let (μ, u) ∈ S(γ ). Let n ∈ N\N and N∗ = N ∪{n}. For each i ∈ N , let π∗(i, n) =
ui = u∗i and for each (i, j) ∈ P(N ), π∗(i, j) = π(i, j). Let γ ∗ = (N∗, π∗). Let
μ∗(n) = n and for each i ∈ N , μ∗(i) = μ(i). Upon the arrival of the new agent
n, no blocking pair is created when “extending” matching μ to matching μ∗. Hence,
(μ∗, u∗) ∈ S(γ ∗) and μ∗ ∈ OM(γ ∗). From the definitions of π∗ and u∗, observe that
every agent i ∈ N can maintain his utility level u∗i by matching with the new agent n.
Let (μ˜, u˜) ∈ S(γ ∗). Recall that if an agent is single at a stable outcome, then at each sta-
ble outcome, he receives his reservation value. Thus, since μ∗(n) = n, u∗n = u˜n = 0.
Since (μ˜, u˜) ∈ S(γ ∗), then for each i ∈ N , u˜i = u˜i + u˜n ≥ π∗(i, n) = u∗i . The
inequality cannot be strict as this would contradict μ∗ ∈ OM(γ ∗). Thus, u˜ = u∗,
i.e., (μ˜, u∗) ∈ S(γ ∗).
By assumption, ϕ(γ ∗) ⊆ S(γ ∗). Thus, S(γ ∗) ∩ ϕ(γ ∗) = ∅, i.e., there exists
(μ˜, u∗) ∈ S(γ ∗) such that (μ˜, u∗) ∈ ϕ(γ ∗). Since (μ∗, u∗) ∈ F(γ ∗), by Pareto indif-
ference (μ∗, u∗) ∈ ϕ(γ ∗). Note that N ⊆ N∗ such that μ∗(N ) = N , γ ∗|N = γ , and
(μ∗|N , u∗|N ) = (μ, u). By consistency, (μ∗|N , u∗|N ) ∈ ϕ(γ ∗|N ). Thus, (μ, u) ∈ ϕ(γ ). unionsq
The next theorem is a counterpart of Sasaki (1995, Theorem 1) for solvable prob-
lems.
Theorem 2 On the class of solvable problems, if ϕ is a subsolution of the core satisfy-
ing invariance with respect to unmatching dummy pairs, continuity, and consistency,
then ϕ coincides with the core.
We prove Theorem 2 in Appendix A.
We show with Examples 3, 4, 5, and 6 at the end of this section that the properties in
each of our theorems are independent.
Remark 3 (Invariance with respect to unmatching dummy pairs and Sasaki’s (1995)
Theorem 1) Note that Sasaki (1995, Theorem 1) states a similar result to our The-
orem 2 for two-sided problems without imposing invariance with respect to un-
matching dummy pairs: “If ϕ is a subsolution of the core satisfying consistency
and continuity, then ϕ = S”. With Example 5, we show that adding invariance
with respect to unmatching dummy pairs is indeed required (also for two-sided
problems). 
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For two-sided and solvable one-sided problems where reservation values are not
fixed, but are allowed to vary (see, for instance, Toda 2005), our Theorem 2 holds
without requiring invariance with respect to unmatching dummy pairs.
Theorem 3 On the class of solvable one-sided problems with non-negative reser-
vation values that are allowed to vary, if ϕ is a subsolution of the core satisfying
continuity and consistency, then ϕ coincides with the core.
We prove Theorem 3 in Appendix B.
Observe that Theorems 2 and 3 imply that fixing reservation values is not without loss
of generality (for both one-sided and two-sided problems).
The following examples demonstrate the independence of properties in Theorems 1
and 2 (Examples 3 and 6 can easily be adjusted for independence in Theorem 3).
Example 3 (A solution that violates consistency, but satisfies all of the remaining
properties in each theorem) Observe that for any γ ∈ N , |N | = 2, with N = {i, j}
and π(i, j) > 0,S(γ ) = {(μ, u) | μ(i) = j and u = (α, π(i, j) − α) for α ∈
[0, π(i, j)]}. For these problems, define ϕˆ to be a subsolution of the core at which the
agent with the lowest index receives the maximum payoff. Formally, for each N ∈ N
and each γ ∈ N ,
ϕˆ(γ ) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
{
(μ, u) ∈ S(γ ) | μ(i) = j, ui = π(i, j), and u j = 0
}
if N = {i, j}, π(i, j) > 0, and i < j;
S(γ ) otherwise. 
Example 4 (A consistent subsolution of the core that is not Pareto Indifferent) Fix
two distinct agents k, l ∈ N. Then, if γ ∈ N is such that k, l ∈ N , check if there
exist different stable outcomes at which agents k and l are matched and not matched,
respectively. If that is the case, then assign the strict subset of stable outcomes at
which agents k and l are not matched. For all other problems, assign the set of all
stable outcomes. Formally, for each N ∈ N and each γ ∈ N ,
ϕ˜(γ ) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
S(γ )\ {(μ¯, u) ∈ S(γ ) | μ¯(k) = l}
ifk, l ∈ N and {(μ, u) ∈ S(γ ) | μ(k) = l} = ∅; (i)
S(γ ) otherwise. (ii) 
Next, to establish the independence of invariance with respect to unmatching
dummy pairs and continuity, we vary the solution ϕ˜ defined in Example 4 in two
different ways.
Example 5 (A consistent and continuous subsolution of the core that is not invariant
with respect to unmatching dummy pairs) We vary ϕ˜ as defined in Example 4 by
changing (i) as follows. For each N ∈ N and each γ ∈ N ,
ϕ′(γ ) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
S(γ )\ {(μ¯, u) ∈ S(γ ) | μ¯(k) = k and μ¯(l) = l}
if k, l ∈ N and {(μ¯, u) ∈ S(γ ) | μ¯(k) = k and μ¯(l) = l} = ∅;
S(γ ) otherwise.
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In order to illustrate that ϕ′ violates invariance with respect to unmatching dummy
pairs, let N = {k, l}, π be such that π(k, l) = 0, γ = (N , π), and let μ, μ¯ be such that
μ(k) = l, μ¯(k) = k and μ¯(l) = l. However, in violation of invariance with respect
to unmatching dummy pairs, ϕ′(γ ) = {(μ, u)}  {(μ, u), (μ¯, u)} = S(γ ), where
u = (0, 0). 
Example 6 (A consistent and invariant with respect to unmatching dummy pairs sub-
solution of the core that is not continuous) We modify ϕ˜ as defined in Example 4 by
adding π(k, l) > 0 to (i). For each N ∈ N and each γ ∈ N ,
ϕ′′(γ ) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
S(γ )\{(μ¯, u) ∈ S(γ ) | μ¯(k) = l}
if k, l ∈ N , {(μ, u) ∈ S(γ ) | μ(k) = l} = ∅, and π(k, l) > 0;
S(γ ) otherwise.
In order to illustrate that ϕ′′ violates continuity, let N = {k, l, m} and π be such that
π(k, l) = π(l, m) = 1 and π(k, m) = 0. Furthermore, for each ε > 0 let πε be
such that πε(k, l) = 1 + ε, πε(l, m) = 1, and πε(k, m) = 0. Let γ = (N , π) and
γ ε = (N , πε) be the corresponding problems, μ, μ¯ be such that μ(l) = m, μ(k) = k,
and μ¯(k) = l, μ¯(m) = m, u = (0, 1, 0), and uε = (0, 1 + ε, 0), with uk, ul , um the
order of components in each payoff vector. Then, for each ε > 0, (μ¯, uε) ∈ ϕ′′(γ ε).
However, in violation of continuity, uε −−→
ε→0 u and (μ¯, u) /∈ ϕ
′′(γ ). 
4.2 Impossibilities and limitations
Recall that for two-sided problems, the core is always non-empty, while for one-sided
problems, the core may be empty (see Example 1). The positive results centered around
consistency in the previous subsection were obtained when restricting attention to the
class of solvable problems. But is it possible to obtain consistency and “nice core
properties” for the entire class of one-sided problems? The following theorem and
corollary show some impossibilities.
Theorem 4 No solution ϕ coincides with the core whenever the core is nonempty and
satisfies consistency.
Proof Let ϕ be a consistent solution such that for each solvable problem γ ∈
, ϕ(γ ) = S(γ ). Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, π such that π(1, 2) = π(2, 3) = π(3, 4) =
π(4, 5) = π(1, 5) = 1, for all (i, j) ∈ P(N ) \ {(1, 2), (2, 3), (3, 4), (4, 5), (1, 5)},
π(i, j) = 0, and γ = (N , π). Note that for any μ ∈ M(N ), 2|C(μ)| + |S(μ)| =
|N | = 5. One can easily show that S(γ ) = ∅ (the proof is similar to the arguments
used in Example 1).
Case 1 Let (μ, u) ∈ ϕ(γ ) such that [|C(μ)| = 0 and |S(μ)| = 5] or [|C(μ)| = 1
and |S(μ)| = 3].
Hence, there exists {i, j} ∈ S(μ) such that j = i + 1 (modulo 5). Thus, π(i, j) =
1. Let N ′ = {i, j} and consider the subproblem γ|N ′ . Then, S(γ|N ′) = {(μ′, u′) |
μ′(i) = j and u′ = (α, 1 − α) for α ∈ [0, 1]} and (μ|N ′ , u|N ′) /∈ S(γ|N ′) (because
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ui = u j = 0). Since S(γ|N ′) = ∅, ϕ(γ|N ′) = S(γ|N ′). Hence, in contradiction to ϕ
being consistent, (μ|N ′, u|N ′) /∈ ϕ(γ|N ′).
Case 2 Let (μ, u) ∈ ϕ(γ ) such that |C(μ)| = 2 and |S(μ)| = 1.
Without loss of generality, assume C(μ) = {(1, 2), (3, 4)} and S(μ) = {5}.
Step 1 Let N ′ = {1, 2, 5} and consider the subproblem γ|N ′ . Then, S(γ|N ′) =
{(μ′, u′), (μ˜, u′) | μ′ = (2, 1, 5), μ˜ = (5, 2, 1), and u′ = (1, 0, 0)}. Since
S(γ|N ′) = ∅, ϕ(γ|N ′) = S(γ|N ′).
If u1 = 1, then in contradiction to ϕ being consistent, (μ|N ′ , u|N ′) /∈ ϕ(γ|N ′).
Hence, u1 = 1.
Step 2 Let N ′′ = {3, 4, 5} and consider the subproblem γ|N ′′ . Then, S(γ|N ′′) =
{(μ′′, u′′), (μ¯, u′′) | μ′′ = (4, 3, 5), μ¯ = (3, 5, 4) and u′′ = (0, 1, 0)}. Since
S(γ|N ′′) = ∅, ϕ(γ|N ′′) = S(γ|N ′′).
If u4 = 1, then in contradiction to ϕ being consistent, (μ|N ′′ , u|N ′′) /∈ ϕ(γ|N ′′).
Hence, u4 = 1.
Step 3 Let N∗ = {1, 2, 3, 4} and consider the subproblemγ|N∗ . Note thatS(γ|N∗) = ∅
(e.g., (μ|N∗ , (0, 1, 1, 0)) ∈ S(γ|N∗)). Hence, ϕ(γ|N∗) = S(γ|N∗).
By consistency, (μ|N∗ , u|N∗) ∈ ϕ(γ|N∗). Recall that μ|N∗ = (2, 1, 4, 3), π(1, 2) +
π(3, 4) = 2, and by Steps 1 and 2, u1 = u4 = 1. But then, u2 = u3 = 0 and
π(2, 3) = 1 imply that (2, 3) is a blocking pair for (μ|N∗ , u|N∗); contradicting
ϕ(γ|N∗) = S(γ|N∗). unionsq
Theorem 4 together with Theorems 1 and 2 implies the following two impossibility
results.
Corollary 1
(a) No solution ϕ is a subsolution of the core whenever the core is nonempty and
satisfies invariance with respect to unmatching dummy pairs, continuity, and con-
sistency.
(b) No solution ϕ is a subsolution of the core whenever the core is nonempty and
satisfies Pareto indifference and consistency.
Sasaki (1995) provides the following two characterizations of the core for two-sided
problems (similarly as for Sasaki’s 1995, Theorem 1, we have corrected his Theorem 2
by adding invariance with respect to unmatching dummy pairs.5)
Sasaki’s (1995) Theorem 2. On the class of two-sided problems, the core is the
unique solution satisfying individual rationality, couple rationality, Pareto optimal-
ity, invariance with respect to unmatching dummy pairs, continuity, consistency, and
weak pairwise-monotonicity.
Sasaki’s (1995) Theorem 4. On the class of two-sided problems, the core is the
unique solution satisfying individual rationality, couple rationality, Pareto optimality,
5 Note that solution ϕ′  S as defined in Example 5 satisfies all properties stated in Sasaki (1995) Theo-
rem 2.
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Pareto indifference, consistency, and weak pairwise-monotonicity.
For two-sided problems, Sasaki (1995) proves his characterizations of the core as
follows.
Step 1. The core satisfies all properties used in both characterizations (his Proposi-
tions 3 and 4).
Step 2. A solution that satisfies all properties as stated in each of the characterizations
is a subsolution of the core (his Theorems 2 and 4).
Step 3. Finally, using Sasaki (1995, Theorems 1 and 3), the characterizations follow.
Note that with Proposition 1 and Theorems 1 and 2, we have established Sasaki’s
Steps 1 and 3 for solvable one-sided problems. Observe, however, that in these steps,
weak pairwise-monotonicity has not been used. A close look at Sasaki’s proofs for
Step 2 reveals that this is where weak pairwise-monotonicity is heavily used. Even
though the core is a weakly pairwise-monotonic solution on the class of solvable
problems, the strength of weak pairwise-monotonicity as a property on the class of
solvable one-sided problems is different from its strength on the class of two-sided
problems. The main difference is that in Sasaki’s two-sided assignment model, any
pairwise-monotonic transformation of a characteristic function (see the definition of
weak pairwise-monotonicity) leads to another two-sided problem and, therefore, to
solvability. However, for solvable one-sided problems, a small pairwise-monotonic
transformation can transform a solvable one-sided problem into a one-sided problem
with an empty core. Thus, for problems on the boundary of the class of solvable
one-sided problems, weak pairwise-monotonicity cannot be used in the same way
as Sasaki (1995) does because it would lead outside the class of solvable one-sided
problems. Whether a counterpart of Sasaki’s (1995) characterization of the core holds
on the class of solvable one-sided problems is an open question.
We conclude with an example that shows that for the class of solvable problems,
changing the value of a couple (i, j) might change the set of core outcomes quite
drastically. In particular, the solvable problem γ ′ is one on the boundary of the class
of solvable problems for which a direct adaptation of Sasaki’s proof Step 2 does not
work (for instance, the pairwise-monotonic transformation from γ ′ to γ ∗ transforms
a solvable problem to one with an empty core).
Example 7 (Changes of the core when the value of a couple changes) Let N = {1, 2, 3}
and ε ∈ (0, 1). Consider the following characteristic functions: π such that π(1, 2) =
2, π(1, 3) = 1, π(2, 3) = 1−ε, π ′ such thatπ ′(1, 2) = 2, π ′(1, 3) = 1, π ′(2, 3) = 1,
and π∗ such that π∗(1, 2) = 2, π∗(1, 3) = 1, π∗(2, 3) = 1 + ε. Then, for the
corresponding problems γ = (N , π), γ ′ = (N , π ′), and γ ∗ = (N , π∗), we have
S(γ ) = {(μ, u) | μ = (2, 1, 3) and u = (1 + α, 1 − α, 0) for α ∈ [0, ε]},S(γ ′) =
{(μ, u) | μ = (2, 1, 3) and u = (1, 1, 0)}, and S(γ ∗) = ∅. 
For the solvable problem γ in Example 7, there is a unique optimal matching and
an infinite number of payoff vectors associated with it; therefore, |S(γ )| = ∞. Fur-
thermore, the infinite cardinality is maintained for small changes of the characteristic
function. Without introducing the formal definitions here, we state that the problem
γ is in the interior of the set of solvable problems. In general, one can show that a
123
Consistency in one-sided assignment problems 429
problem is in the interior of the set of solvable problems whenever the core contains
an infinite set of payoff vectors.
For the solvable problem γ ′ in Example 7 there is a unique optimal matching and
a unique payoff vector; therefore |S(γ ′)| = 1. Furthermore, small changes of the
characteristic function (e.g., as represented by γ or γ ∗ for small ε), change the core:
either from a finite set to an infinite set (if γ ′ is changed to γ ) or from a finite set to an
empty set (if γ ′ is changed to γ ∗). More generally, one can show that a problem is on
the boundary of the set of solvable one-sided problems whenever the core consists of
a unique payoff vector (and thus, a finite outcome set).
Any problem that is not solvable, e.g., γ ∗ in Example 7, is outside of the set of
solvable problems.
We conjecture, that if Sasaki’s (1995, Theorems 2 and 4) characterizations hold on
the class of solvable one-sided problems, the proof techniques for the interior and the
boundary of the class differ.
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A Appendix: Proof of Theorem 2
Let γ ∈ N be a solvable problem. Then, ϕ(γ ) ⊆ S(γ ). We prove that ϕ(γ ) ⊇ S(γ ),
i.e., we show that (μ, u) ∈ S(γ ) implies (μ, u) ∈ ϕ(γ ).
Step 1: Intuitively, we start from γ and a stable outcome (with a maximal number of
dummy agents) and then add a new agent n. We extend the characteristic function
such that each incumbent obtains together with n a value equal to the payoff of the
incumbent prior to n’s arrival. We require the payoff of an incumbent paired with n to
be kept invariant. We extend each optimal matching with n being either single or part
of a dummy pair together with a formerly single incumbent.
Formally, let (μ, u) ∈ S(γ ). We will not work with matching μ directly but with
a matching μD A (possibly μD A = μ) that has a maximal number of dummy agents;
therefore, the only possible difference between μD A and μ is that some dummy agents
for μD A are single at μ, i.e., C(μD A) ⊇ C(μ) and S(μ) \ S(μD A) ⊆ D A(γ, μD A)
and there exists no matching μˆ such that C(μˆ) ⊇ C(μ), S(μ) \ S(μˆ) ⊆ D A(γ, μˆ),
and |D A(γ, μˆ)| > |D A(γ, μD A)|. Note that (μD A, u) ∈ S(γ ) and that at μD A, at
most one agent is single: if more than one agent is single, then μD A is not optimal for
γ (two single agents have a positive value) or it does not match the maximal number
of dummy agents (two single agents have value 0). In the remainder of the proof, we
distinguish the two Cases (a) S(μD A) = {d} and (b) S(μD A) = ∅.
Let n ∈ N\N and N∗ = N ∪ {n}. For each i ∈ N , let π∗(i, n) = ui = u∗i and
for each (i, j) ∈ P(N ), π∗(i, j) = π(i, j). Let γ ∗ = (N∗, π∗). For Case (a), let μ∗
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be such that for each i ∈ N\{d}, μ∗(i) = μD A(i), μ∗(d) = d, and μ∗(n) = n, and
μ¯∗ such that for each i ∈ N\{d}, μ¯∗(i) = μD A(i) and μ¯∗(d) = n. For Case (b),
let μ∗ be such that for each i ∈ N , μ∗(i) = μD A(i) and μ∗(n) = n. Hence, (a)
S(μ∗) = {d, n} and S(μ¯∗) = ∅ and (b) S(μ∗) = {n}. Upon the arrival of the new
agent n, no blocking pair is created when “extending” matching μ to matching μ∗.
Hence, (a) (μ∗, u∗), (μ¯∗, u∗) ∈ S(γ ∗) and (b) (μ∗, u∗) ∈ S(γ ∗).
Step 2: Next, starting from γ ∗, we construct γ ε as follows: we increase by ε the value
of each couple at μ∗ that does not include agent n, and we distribute the benefits
equally between the two members of a couple.
Formally, for Case (a), for each (i, j) ∈ C(μD A),6 [πε(i, j) = π∗(i, j) + ε, uεi =
u∗i + ε2 , and uεj = u∗j + ε2 ], πε(d, n) = π∗(d, n), and uεd = uεn = 0. For each
(i, j) ∈ P(N )\C(μD A), πε(i, j) = π∗(i, j). For Case (b), for each (i, j) ∈ C(μ∗) =
C(μD A), [πε(i, j) = π∗(i, j) + ε, uεi = u∗i + ε2 , and uεj = u∗j + ε2 ] and uεn = 0. For
each (i, j) ∈ P(N ) \ C(μ∗), πε(i, j) = π∗(i, j).
Let γ ε = (N∗, πε). Because the change in couples’ values does not create any
blocking pair, it follows that (a) (μ∗, uε), (μ¯∗, uε) ∈ S(γ ε) and (b) (μ∗, uε) ∈
S(γ ε). Hence, (a) {μ∗, μ¯∗} ⊆ OM(γ ε) and (b) {μ∗} ⊆ OM(γ ε). Note that (a)
D A(γ ε, μ∗) = ∅ and D A(γ ε, μ¯∗) = {d, n} and (b) D A(γ ε, μ∗) = ∅.
Claim 1 (a) OM(γ ε) = {μ∗, μ¯∗} and (b) OM(γ ε) = {μ∗}.
Let μ′ ∈ M(N∗) with (a) μ′ = μ∗, μ¯∗ or (b) μ′ = μ∗. Since for (a) and (b)
(μ∗, u∗) ∈ S(γ ∗), μ∗ ∈ OM(γ ∗). By construction,
∑
(i, j)∈μ∗ πε(i, j) =
∑
(i, j)∈μ∗ π∗(i, j) + |C(μD A)| ε and (4)
∑
(i, j)∈μ′ πε(i, j) =
∑
(i, j)∈μ′ π∗(i, j) + |C(μD A) ∩ C(μ′)| ε. (5)
Observe that
|C(μD A) ∩ C(μ′)| ≤ |C(μD A)|. (6)
By construction of μD A, (a) |C(μD A)| = |N∗|−22 or (b) |C(μD A)| = |N
∗|−1
2 .
Hence, if |C(μD A) ∩ C(μ′)| = |C(μD A)|,7 then C(μ′) = C(μD A) = C(μ∗) and
S(μ′) = S(μ∗). Consequently, μ′ = μ∗, a contradiction. Thus, (6) is strict, which
taken together with (4) and (5) yields ∑(i, j)∈μ∗ πε(i, j) >
∑
(i, j)∈μ′ πε(i, j). Hence,
(a) OM(γ ε) = {μ∗, μ¯∗} and (b) OM(γ ε) = {μ∗}.
By Claim 1, (a) μ∗ and μ¯∗ are the only optimal matchings for γ ε and (b) μ∗ is the
only optimal matching for γ ε. However, there might be infinitely many payoff vectors
associated with these optimal matching(s) (Sotomayor 2003, Theorem 1).
Claim 2 Let (μ∗, u˜) ∈ S(γ ε). Then, for each i ∈ N , |u˜i − uεi | ≤ ε2 .
6 Note that for Case (a), C(μD A) = C(μ∗) = C(μ¯∗)\{(d, n)}.
7 Recall that in Case (a), we also assume μ′ = μ¯∗.
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For Case (a), S(μ∗) = {d, n}, u˜d = uεd = 0, and u˜n = uεn = 0. Hence, |u˜d − uεd | =|u˜n − uεn| = 0. For Case (b), S(μ∗) = {n} and u˜n = uεn = 0. Hence, |u˜n − uεn| = 0.
Now consider couples’ payoffs. Recall that compared to γ ∗, in γ ε, the value of each
couple is increased by ε. Intuitively, we show that any payoff renegotiation within
each pair is bounded by ε, as any attempt of a matched agent to negotiate a payoff in
excess of ε would induce his partner to leave the couple in favor of a partnership with
agent n. Formally, let (i, j) ∈ C(μ∗).
Case 1 u˜i − uεi < − ε2
Then u˜i < uεi − ε2 = u∗i = ui . By construction, for each i ∈ N , π∗(i, n) = ui . Thus,
(i, n) forms a blocking pair, and (μ∗, u˜) /∈ S(γ ε).
Case 2 u˜i − uεi > ε2
Since μ∗ ∈ OM(γ ε), for any (i, j) ∈ C(μ∗), u˜i + u˜ j = uεi + uεj . Then u˜i − uεi =
uεj − u˜ j > ε2 . Thus, u˜ j − uεj < − ε2 and similarly as in Case 1, it follows that
(μ∗, u˜) /∈ S(γ ε).
In Case (a), we have in addition (μ∗, u˜) ∈ S(γ ε) if and only if (μ¯∗, u˜) ∈ S(γ ε).
Step 3: By assumption, ϕ(γ ε) ⊆ S(γ ε). Thus, S(γ ε) ∩ ϕ(γ ε) = ∅. For Case (a),
assume that (μ¯∗, u¯) ∈ S(γ ε)∩ϕ(γ ε). Then, by invariance with respect to unmatching
dummy pairs, (μ∗, u¯) ∈ S(γ ε)∩ϕ(γ ε). Hence, for both cases (a) and (b), there exists
(μ∗, u¯) ∈ S(γ ε)∩ ϕ(γ ε). By Claim 2, for each i ∈ N , |u¯i − uεi | ≤ ε2 . Letting ε → 0,
for each i ∈ N , |u¯i − uεi | → 0 and uεi → u∗i . By continuity, (μ∗, u∗) ∈ ϕ(γ ∗). Note
that for each N ⊆ N∗ such that μ∗(N ) = N , γ ∗|N = γ , and (μ∗|N , u∗|N ) = (μD A, u).
By consistency, (μ∗|N , u∗|N ) ∈ ϕ(γ ∗|N ). Thus, (μD A, u) ∈ ϕ(γ ). Since (μ, u) ∈ F(γ ),
by invariance with respect to unmatching dummy pairs, (μ, u) ∈ ϕ(γ ). unionsq
B Appendix: Proof of Theorem 3
We slightly modify the model of Sect. 2 by extending the definition of a charac-
teristic function π to allow for variable reservation values, i.e., for any N ∈ N
a function π : P(N ) → R+ is a characteristic function for N . In particular,
we now do not require that for each agent i ∈ N , the reservation value π(i, i) is
fixed at 0.
Let γ ∈ N be a solvable problem. Then, ϕ(γ ) ⊆ S(γ ). We prove that
ϕ(γ ) ⊇ S(γ ), i.e., we show that (μ, u) ∈ S(γ ) implies (μ, u) ∈ ϕ(γ ).
Step 1: Let (μ, u) ∈ S(γ ). Let n ∈ N \ N and N∗ = N ∪ {n}. For each i ∈ N ,
let π∗(i, n) = ui = u∗i and for each (i, j) ∈ P(N ), π∗(i, j) = π(i, j). Let
γ ∗ = (N∗, π∗). Let μ∗ be such that for each i ∈ N , μ∗(i) = μ(i) and μ∗(n) = n.
Upon the arrival of the new agent n, no blocking pair is created when “extending”
matching μ to matching μ∗. Hence, (μ∗, u∗) ∈ S(γ ∗).
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Step 2: For each (i, j) ∈ C(μ∗), πε(i, j) = π∗(i, j) + ε, uεi = u∗i + ε2 , and
uεj = u∗j + ε2 , and for each i ∈ S(μ∗), πε(i, j) = uεi = ε2 .8 For each (i, j) ∈
P(N ) \ C(μ∗), πε(i, j) = π∗(i, j). Let γ ε = (N∗, πε). Because the change in
agents’ values does not create any new blocking pairs, it follows that (μ∗, uε) ∈ S(γ ε).
Claim 1 μ∗ is the unique optimal matching for γ ε, i.e., OM(γ ε) = {μ∗}.
Let μ′ ∈ M(N∗) with μ′ = μ∗. Since (μ∗, u∗) ∈ S(γ ∗), μ∗ ∈ OM(γ ∗). By
construction,
∑
(i, j)∈μ∗
πε(i, j) =
∑
(i, j)∈μ∗
π∗(i, j) + |C(μ∗)| ε + |S(μ∗)| ε
2
and (7)
∑
(i, j)∈μ′
πε(i, j) =
∑
(i, j)∈μ′
π∗(i, j) + |C(μ∗) ∩ C(μ′)| ε + |S(μ∗) ∩ S(μ′)| ε
2
. (8)
Observe that
|C(μ∗) ∩ C(μ′)| ≤ |C(μ∗)| and |S(μ∗) ∩ S(μ′)| ≤ |S(μ∗)|. (9)
If |S(μ∗) ∩ S(μ′)| = |S(μ∗)| and |C(μ∗) ∩ C(μ′)| = |C(μ∗)|, then S(μ′) = S(μ∗)
and C(μ′) = C(μ∗). Consequently, μ′ = μ∗, a contradiction. Thus, at least one
of the inequalities in (9) is strict, which taken together with (7) and (8) yields∑
(i, j)∈μ∗ πε(i, j) >
∑
(i, j)∈μ′ πε(i, j). Hence, OM(γ ε) = {μ∗}.
By Claim 1, μ∗ is the unique optimal matching for γ ε.
Claim 2 Let (μ∗, u˜) ∈ S(γ ε). Then, for each i ∈ N , |u˜i − uεi | ≤ ε2 .
For each i ∈ S(μ∗), u˜i = uεi = 0. Hence, |u˜i − uεi | = 0. Let (i, j) ∈ C(μ∗).
Case 1 u˜i − uεi < − ε2
Then, u˜i < uεi − ε2 = u∗i = ui . By construction, for each i ∈ N , π∗(i, n) = ui . Thus,
(i, n) forms a blocking pair, and (μ∗, u˜) /∈ S(γ ε).
Case 2 u˜i − uεi > ε2
Since μ∗ ∈ OM(γ ε), for any (i, j) ∈ C(μ∗), u˜i + u˜ j = uεi + uεj . Then,
u˜i − uεi = uεj − u˜ j > ε2 . Thus, u˜ j − uεj < − ε2 and similarly as in Case 1, it
follows that (μ∗, u˜) /∈ S(γ ε).
Step 3: By assumption, ϕ(γ ε) ⊆ S(γ ε). Thus, S(γ ε) ∩ ϕ(γ ε) = ∅, i.e., there exists
(μ∗, u¯) ∈ S(γ ε) ∩ ϕ(γ ε). By Claim 2, for each i ∈ N , |u¯i − uεi | ≤ ε2 . Letting ε → 0,
for each i ∈ N , |u¯i − uεi | → 0 and uεi → u∗i . By continuity, (μ∗, u∗) ∈ ϕ(γ ∗).
Note that N ⊆ N∗ such that μ∗(N ) = N , γ ∗|N = γ , and (μ∗|N , u∗|N ) = (μ, u). By
consistency, (μ∗|N , u∗|N ) ∈ ϕ(γ ∗|N ). Hence, (μ, u) ∈ ϕ(γ ). unionsq
8 Note that we increase the reservation values of single agents at μ∗—this is only possible if we change
the assignment model to allow reservation values to vary.
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